Legal Sanctions Imposed on Parents in Old Babylonian Legal Sources
One may conclude from an analysis of Old Babylonian legal sources that a parent was not permitted to cancel, without lawful cause, the legal tie between himself and his natural or adopted child by means of the declaration, "you are not my son," or "you are not my daughter." Severe sanctions were imposed on a parent who willfully uprooted his child from his house. The most common sanction found in the scholastic-legal texts and in adoption documents that include a sanction clause against one who deprives his child of his legal status as son and heir is forfeiture of the property of the parent.
Sanctions could be imposed on a parent who tried unlawfully to annul the legal tie between himself and his child by using the formula ul mari attd "you are not my son," or ul mdrti atti "you are not my daughter." These formulae and others, such as ul abi attd "you are not my father," or ul ummi atti "you are not my mother," are verba solemnia which appear in adoption documents, marriage contracts, and deeds for the acquisition of slaves. The aim of such formulae was to mark the exact time of the change in the legal status between the two parties concerned.' S. Greengus has shown2 that the formula was actually spoken during the Old Babylonian period, and that only after the declaration did an accompanying act have legal validity.
The legal consequences of a parent's declaration "you are not my son," or "you are not my daughter," was the dissolution of the legal bond between the child and the parent. This means that the child could be evicted from the house. We shall endeavor to show that negating the right of a child to be an heir was not the exclusive prerogative of the parent. A parent who infringed upon the legal status of a child in violation of the accepted legal norms could expect to be severely punished. 6 Although this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, we will present a few arguments concerning the basic equality between the legal status of a natural child and that of an adopted child, as can be derived from various legal sources. We hope to expand upon this subject at a later date. a) From the denial formula of the adoptee to the adopter: "you are not my father/mother" or of the adopter to the adoptee: "you are not my son/daughter," we learn that the relationship between an adopter and adoptee was like that between a parent and child not merely metaphorically, but legally (cf. It is important to note that in all cases where the sanctions clause refers to both parents, the penalty is the same for both and does not differ as provided in the series ana ittisu cited above. The most severe and frequent penalty imposed on those found guilty is loss of property, movable and immovable. On the other hand, it is possible to punish a child who disavows his parents by selling him into slavery. 19 The verb that defines the penalty for loss of property is elu. It generally appears in the Gt stem form, meaning "to lose."20 How is one to explain this penalty? One possibility is to understand it literally, i.e., the parent who is guilty of disowning his child is to be expelled from his sic similarity of the status of the adopted and the natural sons, one can argue that they also apply to any legal child. house and property. Another possibility is that the parent forfeits only that portion which the adopted child would receive as heir after the death of the father. The adopted son receives this property after the death of the father.21
According to Driver and Miles,22 it is not likely that the intention of this penalty is that the adoptive father should lose all his property. They base themselves on the following two arguments. First, in a number of adoption documents the parent is penalized with two penalties: loss of property and a monetary fine; if he lost all his property where would he get money to pay the fine?23 Second, even the mother who denies her son is penalized by the loss of movable and immovable property, and it would be untenable to say that the father should lose his property because of the actions of his wife. Driver and Miles explain the sanction clause in the following manner: "The penalty is so excessive that it seems unlikely that it should be taken literally, and it seems more probable that these clauses are mere threats inserted in terrorem in the contract of adoption."24
However, it is difficult to accept these arguments. First, the parent might pay the financial penalty from property not included in the family property as recorded in the adoption document OECT 8, 21. There a couple adopts a son and gives him the house, field, garden, and family property as his inheritance portion, and in addition he receives two shekels. If all the property were given to the adopted son, why was it necessary to record that he was given another two shekels? Secondly, Driver and Miles are correct when they say that it would be unacceptable for the father to lose all of his property because the mother denied the son. It is, however, possible that we are dealing in this case with a woman who for some reason has no husband. If she forfeits her property, no husband would suffer any damages.
It is plausible that the legal and practical meaning of the punishment inflicted on parents who disavow their children is that the son receives his share in the family property upon the death of the father. This solution appears reasonable because it is difficult to suppose that the other children should suffer any loss as a result of the criminal behavior of their father toward one of their brothers. Before we examine the significance of this principle for our question, we must make two comments. First, this principle can be found in the Sumerian Family Laws, which are earlier than the series ana ittisu. Secondly, the wording of these sources does not limit their application only to an adopted child. On the contrary, the formulation implies that these sanctions are applicable in any case that a legal child is disowned by a parent.
It is possible to explain the penalty of forfeiture of the property of the parents who wish to annul illegally the legal ties between themselves and their child in the light of the analogy cited by Yaron. This conclusion is supported by a survey of other documents which shows that the 25 It is possible that sections 168-69 of Codex Hammurabi were intended to restrict the authority of a father even further. The father was forbidden to uproot his son without legal cause determined by customary law. In addition, he was compelled to forgive his sinful son for the first offense, and was not permitted to uproot him from his house until after the second guilty verdict. The legal principle common to both the case of the husband who illegally divorces his wife and a parent who illegally disowns a child is that the husband or father is allowed to evict the wife or child, but the law provides for the evicted by means of serious sanctions. A parent who illegally annuls the legal tie between himself and his children loses his house and property. The property remains in the possession of the other legal heirs, and they divide it according to the law. Thus illegal action by a father against one son does not deprive other sons and heirs of their shares. We do not know how this principle actually worked, just as we do not know how the penalties in article 59 of the Laws of Eshnunna and article 137 of the Code of Hammurabi were carried out. As noted above, there are contracts which do not provide for the forfeiture of property. Instead, the document may determine that a father must give his son his share of the inheritance in the father's household. It is possible that this formulation hints at some modification of the forfeiture of the property. However, the legal significance of the two penalties is the same: a parent who disowns his child without just cause cannot negate the child's legal rights as heir.
Analysis of the penalty provisions in school texts and adoption agreements for a parent who denies his legal tie with a child shows that annulling the legal tie required the intervention of legal authorities. The annulment was not a private matter between the parent and the child.27
The earliest available scholastic traditions on the subject of the punishment of the parent are in the Sumerian Family Laws (YOS 1, 28), paragraph 5, and ana ittisu 7 iii 34-45. In view of the laconic formulation of these provisions it is not possible to know who determines whether a parent has disowned his child illegally, or who administers the penalty provided therein. Our contention is that one may conclude from these paragraphs that not only did the law provide important support in the case of willful breaking of the parent-child tie, but also that the penalties could only be administered by a judicial authority to whom the father was subject. This authority could administer punishment to the parent only after the situation had been investigated by the authority and clarified before it. Moreover, both paragraph 4 of the 27 Sections 168-69 of Codex Hammurabi set forth important rules that were intended on the one hand to continue the customary law in this matter, and on the other hand, to execute a significant reform. Most of the Old Babylonian adoption documents from various regions28 include a clause providing for sanctions against an adopter or adoptee who denies the legal ties between them. The clauses contain various penalties, the most common being forfeiture of movable and immovable property. This was the penalty provided for disowning a child according to the scholastic legal sources treated above. One can thus conclude that this severe penalty was imposed on a parent, whether natural or adoptive, who illegally annulled the legal tie between himself and his child.
Inasmuch as adoption is a formal legal agreement, should it be violated, the judicial authority is the proper authority to give legal succor to the injured party. Therefore, one can conclude from the sanction clause that, according to the law practiced in those places where such agreements were composed, an arbitrary annulment of the agreement by the adopter was deemed essentially a violation of the adoption agreement. In such cases the judicial authorities would give legal aid to the injured party. The intervention of the court is to be explained in that the sanctions which were provided by the agreement, especially the severe ones, could only be imposed by an authority to whom the father was subject. It is reasonable to suppose that this authority would punish the parent only after investigating the circumstances and becoming convinced that the parent had indeed violated the adoption agreement. We do not know of documents from which it is possible to deduce that the sanctions were actually imposed on a parent. This, however, does not weaken the argument that a one-sided breach of the adoptive tie was within the jurisdiction of a court.
These legal principles find expression, for example, in the adoption agreement recorded in YOS 12, 206. It was agreed that if the adopter said to his adopted son, "you are not my son," he (nevertheless) was his son, and would have a share in the property as an heir (11. 14-19).29 Although the son had ceased to be considered the son of his father following the declaration, it was provided that the father was obligated to give his son his share in the property, since he did not have a legal cause to deprive his child of his legal status or inheritance.30 It is very likely that we have here an elliptical expression that is to be understood as follows: if a father has cancelled his legal tie to his son, but it is proven to the judicial authorities that the son has not committed a sin against his father for which the father is legally permitted to expel him from the house, then the father is required to give the son his share as son and heir. It is reasonably certain that the execution of this sanction was delayed until after the death of the father. YOS 12, 206 reflects the rule to which we have referred, namely, that the parent does not have the authority to cancel willfully the legal tie with his child and thus deny his rights as son and heir. The law does not prevent the father from removing his child from his house, but it requires him to give the latter his full rights as son and heir. This might prevent the parent from willfully uprooting his child, because he would not wish to pay the high price for this act.
It is fairly certain that one should understand literally the severe sanctions imposed on parents who disowned their children. They forfeited their property, whether movable or immovable. Indeed these penalties are quite severe and would appear to be incomprehensible. However, since there is a common denominator in the Mesopotamian sources for the cases surveyed above, one may conclude that Old Babylonian Mesopotamian legal tradition aimed to protect the legal status of the child. The authorities even proffered legal aid when the head of the household wanted to infringe upon the elementary rights of a child to be considered a son and heir.
The juridical authorities were involved in instances where a parent wished illegally to annul the legal tie between the parent and the child, and they supervised the execution according to all the rules of law. 
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